My concern, however, is, especially in the articles on a specific kind of cryptosystem, the insistence that any particular encryption technology is completely insecure.
An off-the-shelf public-key cryptosystem (e.g. RSA) would suit their purposes just fine.
If the review is negative and gives a non-trivial reason of why the paper should not be published e.g., a clever break of a cryptosystem, a little-known fact that makes a study useless, etc., the review should be published instead of the paper.
To some people at the agency, the scheme was a heresy: you're going to put a back door into a cryptosystem and tell people about it?
By 1991, they had a complete cryptosystem that was to reside in a tamperproof computer chip, built around a powerful secret mathematical encryption formula called Skipjack but including other components like digital signatures.