As he puts it in discussing the Sextus 'attitude to the external world, â€œHis own deep skepticism leaves him in a state of epochÃƒÂª, not only as to whether there are any such things as Ëœexternal objects', but even as to whether these terms of the Dogmatists have any intelligible meaning at all.â€
And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; Â—external, I mean, to your own mind: though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if it existed out of a mind.
This enormous external current must be accompanied by some effect within the fish _equivalent_ to a current, the direction of which is from the tail towards the head, and equal to the sum of _all these external_ forces.
The term external legal history could better be applied to â€˜law in historyâ€™ and internal legal history to â€˜history of lawâ€™.
In this relation, the term external does not signify existence in another place than where I am, nor my resolution and acceptance at another time than the moment in which I have the offer of a thing: it signifies only an object different from or other than myself.